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This paper discusses the regulation of self-defence in Slovenian and international criminal law. Firstly 
the elements of self-defence in international criminal law are discussed. The paper also analyses the influ-
ence of self-defence on the general definition of a criminal act. This is followed by drawing the distinction 
between similar defences; self-defence and putative self-defence on one hand and self-defence and necessity 
on the other. Paper is concluded by presentation of Slovenian regulation of self-defence from the viewpoint 
of international criminal law. 
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Сабіна Згага 
Регулювання самооборони в словенському та міжнародному кримінальному законодавстві 
У статті розглядаються питання регулювання самооборони в словенському і міжнародному 
кримінальному законодавстві. По-перше, обговорюються елементи самооборони в міжнародному 
кримінальному праві. У статті також аналізується вплив самооборони на загальне визначення зло-
чинного діяння. Потім – відмінність між аналогічними засобами захисту; самооборони і ймовірної 
самооборони, з одного боку, і самооборони і необхідності – з іншого. Стаття завершується розгля-
дом регулювання самооборони у Словенії з точки зору міжнародного кримінального права. 
Ключові слова: самооборона, правова цінність, пропорційність, Кримінальний кодекс Словенії, 
Римський статут, міжнародне кримінальне право. 
 
Сабина Згага 
Регулирование самообороны в словенском и международном уголовном законодательстве 
В статье рассматриваются вопросы регулирования самообороны в словенском и международном 
уголовном законодательстве. Во-первых, обсуждаются элементы самообороны в международном 
уголовном праве. В статье также анализируется влияние самообороны на общее определение пре-
ступного деяния. Затем следует различие между аналогичными средствами защиты; самообороны 
и предполагаемой самообороны, с одной стороны, и самообороны и необходимости – с другой. Ста-
тья завершается представлением регулирования самообороны в Словении с точки зрения междуна-
родного уголовного права. 
Ключевые слова: самооборона, правовая ценность, пропорциональность, Уголовный кодекс Сло-
вении, Римский статут, международное уголовное право. 
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Problem statement. Self-defence is a typical 
criminal law defence. It represents diversion of an 
unlawful attack on the perpetrator or another person 
towards the source of the attack. Self-defence is 
regulated also in international criminal law and has 
also been a subject of the case law of many interna-
tional and hybrid tribunals, despite the lack of its 
formal regulation in the statutes of tribunals until 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court [1, art. 31].  
Due to a very strong interaction between inter-
national criminal and international public law the 
distinction between individual self-defence of an 
individual and collective self-defence of a state ac-
cording to the United Nations Charter should firstly 
be made [2, p. 65, 75]. Already the case law of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal concluded that this differentia-
tion should be carefully drawn [3, p. 121]. The In-
ternational Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
on the other side simply referred to the clear regula-
tion of the Rome Statute, which was already drafted 
at the time, but not yet enforced. Accordingly, the 
ICTY concluded that the fact that the person was 
involved in a defensive operation conducted by 
forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for ex-
cluding criminal responsibility [3, p. 452]. Identical 
rule could be found in the Rome Statute [4, p. 13].  
Individual self-defence and collective self-
defence are therefore two different defences with 
different conditions, elements and also consequenc-
es. Individual self-defence is a typical ground for 
justification in case of potential individual criminal 
responsibility. On the other hand, collective self-
defence is a defence, which could only be applied 
to a state and which could (according to interna-
tional public law) exclude responsibility of a state 
for its violation of international public law, espe-
cially of article 51 of the United Nations Charter. A 
state could be responsible, if the perpetrator’s act 
could be attributed to the state according to the 
Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Inter-
nationally Wrongful Acts [5, chapter 2]. Individual 
could still invoke collective self-defence to exclude 
his or her criminal responsibility, however in such 
case this defence does not constitute an individual 
self-defence. In such case the collective self-
defence would represent a ground for justification, 
originating from other legal branches.  
As mentioned before, fulfilment of all condi-
tions of collective self-defence does not mean that 
conditions of individual self-defence are automati-
cally fulfilled as well and vice versa. These two de-
fences are different and their factual cases should 
rarely overlap. It is not rare that a case of individual 
self-defence has no connection to collective self-
defence, for example, when a prisoner of war at-
tacks his guard with a weapon, the guard defends 
himself and executes the prisoner of war. Opposite 
case could be possible as well; conditions of collec-
tive, but not also of individual self-defence could be 
fulfilled, such as in the case of humanitarian inter-
vention for protection of ethnic minority. The dif-
ference between these two defences lies also in le-
gal values, protected by them. The collective self-
defence is possible for protection of public legal 
values or legal values, belonging to the state, 
whereas the individual self-defence deals with indi-
vidual legal values.  
Analysis of recent research and publications. 
For now, various aspects of regulation of self-
defence in Slovenian and especially internationally 
criminal law are presented, as considered in funda-
mental works in the field of international criminal 
law. 
The purpose of the paper. The puporpose of 
this paper is to analyse the elements of self-defence 
in international criminal law, the influence of self-
defence on the general definition of a criminal act, 
to draw distinction between similar defences; self-
defence and putative self-defence on one hand and 
self-defence and necessity on the other; and to as-
sess Slovenian regulation of self-defence from the 
viewpoint of international criminal law. 
Statement of the base material. The definition 
of self-defence in international criminal law does 
not differ much from its typical definition in na-
tional legal systems; it represents the defence 
against unlawful attack, directed at the perpetrator 
or a third person, whereas the defence itself is di-
rected towards the source of attack or his legal val-
ue [2, p. 137]. The attack on the perpetrator or a 
third person must be unlawful. This has been rec-
ognised by the case law of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
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[6, p. 163], as well as of the ICTY [7, p. 986]. The 
same rule could be found in the regulation of self-
defence in the Rome Statute [8, p. 176]. Conse-
quently, as in national systems, the source of an at-
tack can only be human [8, p. 176]. This is also one 
of the main differences between self-defence and 
necessity, where the danger could result also from 
other sources, such as nature, animals, weather 
conditions, etc. 
The tribunals have dealt also with an issue, 
which legal values could be protected by self-
defence. The Nuremberg case law however does 
not give clear answer to this question. In certain 
judgements the tribunal for example decided that 
killing is justified, if committed in self-defence 
from an attack on life or body, but not, if only 
property was attacked [7, p. 986]. Still, such deci-
sion cannot lead to a simple conclusion that self-
defence of property is absolutely not justified. Ac-
cording to certain Nuremberg case law it was not 
justified, because the perpetrator defended the 
property by killing the attacker. The defence was 
therefore massively disproportional. An absolute 
prohibition of defending property and even more 
generally any legal value, other than life and body, 
is therefore in my opinion an inappropriate conclu-
sion of Nuremberg case law.  
The prevailing opinion regarding the ICTY is 
namely similar; self-defence of a person is allowed 
[9, p. 85], as well as of property [10, p. 335]. Self-
defence of a person should however not be inter-
preted narrowly so that it only allows defence of 
life, body and other individual legal values, directly 
linked to the body of the defended person, but more 
broadly. It should be interpreted in a broader man-
ner to encompass all legal individual legal values, 
belonging to the defended person (honour and repu-
tation, sexual autonomy, property etc.). Conse-
quently, special reference to property becomes ir-
relevant, as the property is also an individual legal 
value of a certain person and thereby protected as 
such. Such particular legislative technique, found in 
international case law, is a reflection of Anglo-
American influence, since in these legal systems 
the distinction in regulation of self-defence of per-
son and property remains decisive [11, p. 158]. 
The Rome Statute also followed Anglo-
American approach and dividedly allowed the de-
fence of a person (the perpetrator himself or herself 
or of another person) or, in the case of war crimes, 
the defence of property which is essential for the 
survival of the person or another person or property 
which is essential for accomplishing a military mis-
sion [4, p. 11]. In my opinion a broader interpreta-
tion of the protected value would be appropriate 
here also, but with explicit consideration of formal 
limitation of defence of property, which is only al-
lowed in case of war crimes. Also, only defence of 
property which is essential for the survival of the 
person or another person or property which is es-
sential for accomplishing a military mission could 
be justified according to the Rome Statute. There 
has been much criticism regarding this limitation. 
Some scholars namely share the opinion opinion 
that military necessity found its way into the Rome 
Statute as a general ground for justification despite 
its explicit prohibition in customary international 
law [12, p. 169]. Such criticism however does not 
hold water. The defence in question is self-defence 
and each act of the perpetrator, if it wants to be 
pronounced self-defence, must fulfil all conditions 
of self-defence, including the defence of property. 
Defence of property is only additionally limited by 
a condition that it must also fulfil the conditions of 
military necessity. Therefore, the regulation of self-
defence of property is a case of additional limita-
tion of self-defence and not an opposite case of 
broadening military necessity. This interpretation is 
supported also by the travaux préparatoires of the 
Rome Statute.  
The Rome Statute regulates a narrow conception 
of legal values, potentially protected by self-
defence [13, p. 319], due to strong opposition to 
regulating self-defence in the Rome Statute at all. 
Many were namely of the thought it would be inap-
propriate to justify the perpetrator’s act due to his 
defence of property, because the relevant criminal 
acts in the Rome Statute are such horrible crimes - 
the core crimes [9, p. 87]. Such argument seems ir-
rational and seems (again) to reflect the Anglo-
American particular regulation of defences. Contra-
ry to this, defences and more specifically self-
defence should be regulated in a more general 
manner. Namely, rules of the general part of the 
criminal law should be drafted in such manner, so 
that they could be applied to all criminal acts from 
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the special part of criminal law. All the potential 
peculiarities and circumstances of concrete cases of 
criminal acts should be considered while drafting 
the rules of the general part. This should apply also 
to the regulation of defences, which should be 
drafted in such manner, so that any case of potential 
defence could be subsumed and assessed according 
to such regulation. Especially relevant in case of 
self-defence is the relationship between the attack 
and the defence - more specifically their propor-
tionality. If defences were drafted in such general 
manner and proportionality were demanded be-
tween attack and defence, there is no possibility to 
justify killing of another person (with potentially 
genocidal intent) by defending property. From this 
point of view the Rome Statute made step forward 
towards more general definition of self-defence; it 
namely demands that the defence must be propor-
tionate to the degree of danger, as well as reasona-
ble and necessary. Such general conditions of self-
defence in my opinion sufficiently prevent extreme 
anomalies and justification of extreme cases in case 
law and would enable appropriate solutions of all 
potential concrete cases of self-defence. According-
ly, any a priori exclusion of defending certain legal 
values is inappropriate and also superfluous. Sec-
ond argument against such distinction lies in its 
consequence. Legal values, which the perpetrator 
cannot defend via self-defence, are left unprotected 
and vulnerable to unlawful attacks. Unlawful at-
tacks on such legal values are therefore legally al-
lowed, whereas unlawful attacks on other legal val-
ues are not allowed. Such distinction is discriminat-
ing. As most of the national legal systems pay re-
gard to the proportionality between the attack and 
defence in some way (some explicitly require pro-
portionality, whereas others define it in a negative 
manner; self-defence is excluded, if the defence is 
disproportional in comparison to the attack), this 
requirement eliminates any extreme cases of self-
defence in practice.  
Such condition can be found also in the Rome 
Statute. Namely, the defence must be proportionate 
to the degree of danger to the person or the other 
person or property protected [14, p. 549]. The Nu-
remberg Tribunal also implicitly introduced the re-
quirement of proportionality, since it decided that 
killing is justified, when the attack was directed to-
wards life or body and not, when directed towards 
property only [7, p. 986]. The same applies to the 
case law of ICTY [2, p. 137].  
Self-defence could only be directed towards the 
source of the unlawful attack. This importantly dis-
tinguishes self-defence from necessity in interna-
tional, as well as national criminal law. Such re-
quirement could be found also in the case law of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal [2, p. 243], as well as in 
the case law of ICTY [6, p. 163] and in the Rome 
Statute [15, p. 190]. Strict limitation regarding ac-
cord in time between the attack and defence is pre-
scribed as well. The attack according to the Rome 
Statute must be imminent [4, p. 11]. Similar limita-
tion could be found also in comparative legal sys-
tems [16, p. 665].  
In comparative law self-defence is usually a typ-
ical ground for justification of the perpetrator’s act; 
the act’s unlawfulness is therefore excluded. It is 
considered that the perpetrator's act is in accordance 
with the law, when committed in self-defence. Con-
trary to this, there has not yet been clear case law 
on this subject in international criminal law, and an 
answer to the question, whether self-defence is a 
ground for justification or for excuse [2, p. 65]. The 
prevailing opinion is however conclusive with 
comparative criminal law findings that self-defence 
justifies the perpetrator’s act [8, p. 174]. This posi-
tion is in my opinion correct. Self-defence namely 
deals with diversion of an unlawful attack and of an 
act, which is not in accordance with the law. The 
diversion of such act in inevitably in accordance 
with the law and its unlawfulness should therefore 
be excluded.  
Self-defence as an excuse would be an inappro-
priate solution, because in such case the attacker, 
the source of unlawful attack and the target of its 
diversion would have a right to self – defence 
against such act. Self-defence as a ground for justi-
fication also emphasises the essence of the self-
defence. Necessity is differentiated into justifiable 
and excusable and the basis for such distinction is 
the relationship between the harm, which threat-
ened and the harm done. This relationship is rele-
vant also with self-defence, but has a different role. 
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Here it is its main role to prevent extreme defences 
and excesses in this relevance.  
As already mentioned, there is a strong Anglo-
American influence on international criminal law, 
which can be recognised also in case of non-
distinction between the actual existence of a ground 
for justification on one side and mere mistake of its 
existence (mistake on grounds for justification) on 
the other side. International tribunals have long not 
distinguished between the actual self-defence, when 
the attack actually existed, and putative self-
defence, when the perpetrator was only (reasona-
bly) convinced of the unlawful attack. For example, 
the Nuremberg Tribunal’s case Munda and Weiss 
dealt with following facts; the prisoner of war made 
a sudden move, reached with his hand into his 
pocket. One of the defendants was convinced that 
he had been reaching for weapon to shoot at them, 
that is why he shot he, whereas the second defend-
ant felt threatened due to the shooting, turned 
around and also started shooting [17, p. 149]. If the 
victim had reached for weapon in his pocket, this 
would have been a case of self-defence. However, 
the perpetrators were only convinced about that, 
they were only convinced that the unlawful attack 
existed against them; they were suffering under 
mistakes. The tribunal acquitted the defendants, 
claiming it was a case of self-defence, whereas they 
should have really been acquitted due to putative 
self-defence (mistake on grounds for justification), 
because there was no real unlawful attack. And this 
is a case of clear Anglo-American influence, be-
cause in these legal systems it suffices for self-
defence that the perpetrator is reasonably convinced 
of the existence of unlawful attack and its actual ex-
istence is not necessary [17, p. 150].  
Self-defence and necessity are very similar de-
fences. In both cases the perpetrator fulfils the defi-
nition of a criminal act to divert a certain danger 
from himself or another person; in case of self-
defence this is an unlawful attack, and in case of 
necessity this is a more general danger. There could 
be factual cases, where it needs to be differentiated 
between necessity and self-defence. Especially 
three such cases could be relevant: 
- when the perpetrator diverts the unlawful at-
tack towards a third person and not towards the 
source of an attack; 
- when the attacker uses to execute his unlawful 
attack a good, belonging to a third person or a third 
person and consequently also the diversion of this 
attack is directed towards such third person;  
- when the perpetrator diverts the danger to-
wards its source and not towards a third, innocent 
person. 
When an unlawful attack is diverted against a 
third person, this should be considered as a case of 
necessity and not self-defence. The fact that the un-
lawful attack is diverted towards a third person and 
his legal values is more important than the fact that 
we are dealing with an unlawful attack. The neces-
sity’s danger is not necessarily unlawful, its source 
is irrelevant and encompasses also unlawful attacks, 
being diverted towards a third person.  
When an attacker launches an unlawful attack 
and uses for that a third person or his goods, the 
first question, that needs to be answered, is, wheth-
er the attack is diverted towards a third person or 
the source of attack? Although usually this is a case 
of self-defence, because the source of the attack 
was the attacker, towards whom the attack was also 
diverted, this issue in my opinion should not be so 
easily resolved. The legal interest of this third per-
son, who has been used for the attack and later 
harm by the defence, should be taken into consider-
ation, as well as the principle of subjective guilt. If 
the perpetrator, who diverted the unlawful attack, 
was aware that the person or his goods were not the 
source of attack but only used for it by the attacker, 
the situation should be considered a case of necessi-
ty. If he was not aware of it, the situation should be 
assessed as self-defence.  
This interpretation is in my opinion also in ac-
cordance with the subjective element of the self-
defence, because the perpetrator, who diverts the 
unlawful attack, needs to be aware of the attack and 
of the fact that he is diverting an attack with his act. 
Such awareness is impossible, when the perpetrator 
is aware, that goods of a third person were used for 
the unlawful attack. In opposite case, when he is 
not aware of such misuse of a third person for the 
attack, he is convinced of an unlawful attack taking 
place. 
When the perpetrator diverts danger (and not an 
unlawful attack) towards its source and not towards 
a third person, is this a case of necessity, because 
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unlawful attack is a prerequisite for self-defence, 
but it does not exist in this case.  
The definition of self defence has been very tra-
ditional and unalterable for long and was in Slove-
nia not amended even with the introduction of 
Criminal Code - 1 [18, art. 22], which otherwise 
caused many changes also in the field of defences. 
Self-defence represents a defence of perpetrator 
towards the source of unlawful [19, p. 234] attack 
(and not towards third innocent persons) [19, 
p. 236], which threatens any legal value [20, p. 52] 
of the perpetrator or a third person [19, p. 232]. 
Self-defence is traditionally considered ground for 
justification. Main differences between self defence 
and necessity are following according to Slovenian 
scholars: 
- self-defence deals with the diversion of attack 
towards its source, whereas necessity represents di-
version of danger towards third, innocent person; 
however, if as a weapon or instrument of the un-
lawful attack a third person or his object is used, it 
is considered a self-defence and not necessity [19, 
p. 246]; Such general interpretation should in my 
opinion be differentiated into two situations: when 
the perpetrator is aware that an object of a third 
person is being used, rules of necessity should ap-
ply and when he is not aware of it, rules of self de-
fence.  
- self-defence deals with unlawful attack, which 
necessarily originates with a man, whereas necessi-
ty deals with danger, which source could be human, 
natural or animal. In case of a human source of the 
danger the situation must distinguished from un-
lawful attack with self-defence. Rules on existence 
of unlawful attack are stricter (willingful and un-
lawful act), which do not apply to necessity [19, 
p. 244]. 
Such regulation of self-defence and especially 
its distinction towards necessity does not differenti-
ate from the regulation in the Rome Statute. 
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